

ADVERSE SELECTION AND NON-TAKE INFERENCE

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
Aush Thaker, InfoCentricity, Inc. , Novato, California

- 1. What is Adverse Selection? How to define, measure?**
- 2. Traditional Measure: Shift in Score Distributions for Takes**
- 3. Definition of No Adverse Selection**
- 4. Conservation of Counts and Role of Non-Take Inference**
- 5. Differential Risk and Response Elasticities:
Bayes' Rule and "No Free Lunch"**
- 6. Revising Risk Scores with woe on Take Rates**
- 7. Summary**

TRADITIONAL VALIDATION OF ADVERSE SELECTION

Comparing Distributions of Scores in Take and Non-Take Populations for Three Price Tiers

Figure 1



0 .1 50 GRAPHFREQ (4 6 8 10) (0 5) (-5 5) (14 7 8) TAKENOTTAKEREC DEV1512

REQUIREMENTS FOR BAD ADVERSE SELECTION (BAS) ?

For behavioral/demographic/financial data $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}$, loan rate $r \in \mathcal{R}$:

1. $p(B | T, \mathbf{x}) > p(B | \mathbf{x}) = \Pr\{\text{loan default by borrower} | \mathbf{x}\}$
2. $p(T | B, \mathbf{x}, r) > p(T | \mathbf{x}, r) = \Pr\{\text{borrower Takes loan offer} | \mathbf{x}, r\}$
3. *BAS* if **cdf** of Risk Scores of Takes dominates Non-Takes
4. *BAS* iff $\frac{\partial p(B | T, \mathbf{x}, r)}{\partial r} > 0$ {Phillips & Raffard (2009)}
5. Other

EQUALITY OF BAYES FACTORS ALWAYS HOLDS:

Equation 7

$$\frac{p(B | T, \mathbf{x}, r)}{p(B | \mathbf{x}, r)} = \frac{p(T | B, \mathbf{x}, r)}{p(T | \mathbf{x}, r)}$$

DEFINITION OF NO ADVERSE SELECTION, NAS:

Equation 8


$$\frac{p(B | T, \mathbf{x}, r)}{p(B | \mathbf{x}, r)} = \frac{p(T | B, \mathbf{x}, r)}{p(T | \mathbf{x}, r)} = 1 \quad G, B \perp T, N, r | \mathbf{x}$$

DEFINITION OF BAD ADVERSE SELECTION, BAS:

Equation 9

$$\frac{p(B | T, \mathbf{x}, r)}{p(B | \mathbf{x}, r)} = \frac{p(T | B, \mathbf{x}, r)}{p(T | \mathbf{x}, r)} > 1 \quad \mathbf{GAS} : < 1$$


TWO-STAGE OFFER DECISION MADE BY LENDER BASED ON RESPONSE AND BASELINE DEFAULT SCORE




TWO-STAGE DECISION WITH ACTION-BASED DEFAULT AND RESPONSE SCORE

(Offer-dependent Default Risk with Bad Adverse Selection)

See Figure 2(b)



TAKE, Non-Prepay VAL2012



RR←TNTPNRECORDS VAL2012 □CHART 1000 2↑(3⇒RR)[;6 7]]

COMPARING PREDICTED COUNTS WITH OBSERVED RESPONSES AND GOODS/BADS

Table 1

	E[#Goods]	E[#Bads]	Observed #Goods	Observed #Bads	Totals
Takes (T)	1530.0	127.8	1508	150	1658
Non-Takes (N)	3331.0	273.7			3605
Total Accepts by Lender	4862.0	401.5			5263

Table 1: Predicted and Observed Cell Counts for Goods/Bads, Takes/Not-Takes

(4 6) (2 3) (7 4) (14 7 8) EXPOBSADVSEL and EXPADVSEL DEV1612

COUNTS OF OBSERVED GOODS/BADS AND RESPONSES

	Goods	Bads	Totals
Takes (T)	250	50	300
Not Takes (N)			1200
Total Accepts (A)			1500

COUNTS OF OBSERVED GOODS/BADS AND RESPONSES WITH NON-TAKE INFERENCE COUNT, Z

	Goods	Bads	Totals
Takes (T)	250	50	300
Not Takes (N)	1200-Z	Z	1200
Total Accepts (A)	1450-Z	50+Z	1500

See Table 1

Z is the inferred number of Bads among the Non-Takes

Reallocation of Adverse Counts, Y, to obtain NAS

Tables 2, 3 and 4

	Goods	Bads	Totals
Takes (T)	250	50-Y	300-Y
Not Takes (N)	1200-Z	Z+Y	1200-Y
Total Accepts (A)	1450-Z	50+Z	1500

NAS: $\frac{250}{50 - Y} = \frac{1200 - Z}{Z + Y}$, $Y(Z) \geq 0$ is number of Bad Adverse Selects

Counts of Observed (Inferred) Goods/Bads (Action Based Default Score Segment 2-3 in VAL2012)

See Table 6

3-5% APR Premium	Observed/Inferred #Goods	Observed/Inferred # Bads/Goods (Adverse Selects)	Totals
Non-Prepays	547	36 (Y= - 5.3)	583
Non-Takes and Prepay s	305 0	235.5 (Z)	328 6
Accepts	359 7	271.5	386 9

5-7% APR Premium	Observed/Inferred #Goods	Observed/Inferred # Bads/Goods (Adverse Selects)	Totals
Non-Prepays	493	76 (Y= +31.8)	569
Non-Takes and Prepay s	538 2	450.5 (Z)	583 2
Accepts	587 5	526.5	640 1

(DATA← (3 5 7) (2 3) (4 4) (14 7 8) EXTRACTRECORDS VAL2012)(3 7 EXPOBSADVSEL2 DATA)(1/6/11)

DIFFERENTIAL RISK AND RESPONSE ELASTICITIES

Response:

$$\varepsilon^{(T)} \triangleq \frac{\partial p(T | \mathbf{x}, r)}{\partial r} \frac{r}{p(T | \mathbf{x}, r)} = \frac{\partial p/p}{\partial r/r}$$

$$\varepsilon_B^{(T)} \triangleq \frac{\partial p(T | B, \mathbf{x}, r)}{\partial r} \frac{r}{p(T | B, \mathbf{x}, r)}$$

Risk:

$$\delta^{(B)} \triangleq \frac{\partial p(B | \mathbf{x}, r)}{\partial r} \frac{r}{p(B | \mathbf{x}, r)}$$

$$\delta_T^{(B)} \triangleq \frac{\partial p(B | T, \mathbf{x}, r)}{\partial r} \frac{r}{p(B | T, \mathbf{x}, r)}$$

See Equations 16 through 19

Six Response Elasticities: Three for Takes Six Risk Elasticities: Three for Bads

$$\mathbf{E} = \begin{array}{c} \text{Response} \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc} \epsilon_G^{(T)} & \epsilon_B^{(T)} & \epsilon^{(T)} \\ \epsilon_G^{(N)} & \epsilon_B^{(N)} & \epsilon^{(N)} \end{array} \right] \end{array} \quad \Delta = \begin{array}{c} \text{Risk} \\ \left[\begin{array}{cc} \delta_T^{(G)} & \delta_T^{(B)} \\ \delta_N^{(G)} & \delta_N^{(B)} \\ \delta^{(G)} & \delta^{(B)} \end{array} \right] \end{array}$$

See Equation 20

No Free Lunch Equation

Use Bayes' Rule:

$$p(B|T, \mathbf{x}, r) = \frac{p(T|B, \mathbf{x}, r)}{p(T|\mathbf{x}, r)} p(B|\mathbf{x}, r)$$

Derivative with respect to loan rates:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial}{\partial r} p(B|T, \mathbf{x}, r) &= \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \frac{p(T|B, \mathbf{x}, r)p(B|\mathbf{x}, r)}{p(T|\mathbf{x}, r)} \\ &= \frac{p(B|T, \mathbf{x}, r)}{r} \left(\varepsilon_B^{(T)} - \varepsilon^{(T)} + \frac{\partial p(B|\mathbf{x}, r)}{\partial r} \frac{r}{p(B|\mathbf{x}, r)} \right) \end{aligned}$$

yields the risk-response exchange:

$$\delta_T^{(B)} - \delta^{(B)} = \varepsilon_B^{(T)} - \varepsilon^{(T)} \quad \text{Equation 24}$$

The change (deviation) in the price-risk elasticity for Bads among Takes equals the change (deviation) in the price-response elasticities for Takes among Bads.

Response Updates to Prior Risk Scores

See Equation 38

$$s_p(r | T) \triangleq \ln \frac{p(G | T, \mathbf{x}, r)}{p(B | T, \mathbf{x}, r)} = s_p(r) + \ln \frac{q_G(\mathbf{x}, r)}{q_B(\mathbf{x}, r)}$$

See Equation 40

$$\Delta s_p \triangleq s_p(r | T) - s_p(r | N) = \ln \frac{q_G(\mathbf{x}, r)}{q_B(\mathbf{x}, r)} - \ln \frac{1 - q_G(\mathbf{x}, r)}{1 - q_B(\mathbf{x}, r)}$$

May help explain the shift in default score distributions for Take/Not-Take populations in Figure 1

SUMMARY

Equality of Bayes' Factors shows that Bad Adverse Selection of those who Take are equivalent to Increased Take rates for Bads.

Bayes' factor of 1 defines NAS. Non-Take Inference is directly incorporated in estimates of number of Adverse Selections. This allows asymmetric information available to borrowers to be reflected in their preferences and differential responses.

Price-risk elasticities act in concert with price-response elasticities; there are six elasticities of each type and four conservation equations for exchange of risk and response elasticities. No Free Lunches.

Posterior Take/Non-Take Risk scores (and differences between differential Response Rates) can be estimated from weight of evidence on Take/Non-Take rates.